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CO-CONSPIRATOR DECLARATIONS: PROCEDURE AND
STANDARD OF PROOF FOR ADMISSION UNDER
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Surveillance agents assigned to the scene of an anticipated drug sale
observed a meeting between Grey and Johnson. The two either
shook hands or crossed their hands, fists opening and closing, imme-
diately before and immediately after Grey sold a packet of heroin to
an undercover narcotics agent. Both Johnson and Grey were ar-
rested and charged with the sale of and with conspiracy to sell nar-
cotics. Grey was tried separately and was unavailable as a witness
against Johnson. At Johnson's trial, the surveillance agents testified
about the observed contact between Grey and Johnson. In addition,
the prosecution sought to introduce the undercover agent's testimony
of a meeting with Grey shortly before the drug transaction. The
agent stated that Grey had pointed to Johnson, who was getting into
a car, and had told the agent that his 'partner, Joe' was going to get
the heroin. Johnson's first name is Joe.'
The hearsay rule2 should preclude Grey's incriminating statement
to the agent. Yet, even before the Federal Rules of Evidence were en-
acted in 1975, the remark might have been admissible evidence at trial
due to an exception to the hearsay rule.3 Now under the new Federal
Rules of Evidence,4 such statements are not hearsay "if offered against
a party and. . .[made] by a co-conspirator of a party during the course
and in furtherance of the conspiracy."'5  Thus, rule 801(d)(2)(E)
changes remarks made by co-conspirators to nonhearsay.
Under the common law rule, these statements generally were
thought to have been excepted from classification as hearsay due to the
theory that co-conspirators are partners in crime and thus become each
other's agents: 6
I. The facts are loosely based on those in United States v. Herrera, 407 F. Supp. 766 (ND.
111. 1975).
2. Hearsay is an out-of-court declaration offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Hearsay is generally inadmissible because the declarant, not being in court, is not subject to cross-
examination. Therefore, the statement is not considered reliable enough for the trier of fact to
consider it. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1361-62, 1420 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
3. Statements of co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy were considered excep-
tions to the hearsay rule prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g.,
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
4. FED. R. EVID. 101-1103.
5. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) [hereinafter referred to as rule 801(d)(2)(E)]. The rule applies
in both criminal and civil cases. See United States v. One 1975 Lincoln Continental, 72 F.R.D.
535 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
6. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218 n.6 (1974). However, the Advisory Com-
mittee's Notes indicate that the agency theory of conspiracy is a fiction at best. Co-conspirator
declarations have been classified as nonhearsay as a result of the adversary system, which has
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Such declarations are admitted upon no doctrine of the law of evi-
dence, but of the substantive law of crime. When men enter into an
agreement for an unlawful end, they become ad hoc agents for one
another, and have made 'a partnership in crime.' What one does pur-
suant to their common purpose, all do, and, as declarations may be
such acts, they are competent against all. 7
More likely, the true reason for the co-conspirator nonhearsay rule is
that such statements are a necessity if the crime of conspiracy, normally
carried out in secret, is ever to be proved.8
Yet, before a co-conspirator's remarks can be entered into evi-
dence and considered against a defendant, four prerequisites must be
met. Initially, the existence of a conspiracy and the party/defendant's
participation in the conspiracy must be shown.9 In addition, rule
801(d)(2)(E) requires two further elements, that the statement was
made in the course' 0 and in furtherance of the conspiracy." 1 It is not a
prerequisite that a conspiracy be one of the formal charges, since "a
joint venturer is considered as a co-conspirator for the purposes of the
rule." 12
However, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not resolve the follow-
ing two aspects of the procedure for admitting co-conspirator utter-
ances:
(1) Does the judge or jury decide if the prerequisites to
admitting the statements have been met?
(2) How much evidence must be presented to show the
already established that statements by a conspirator can be admitted against a co-conspirator. 28
U.S.C. app., Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules [of Evid.], Rule 801, Subdivi-
sion(d)(2) (1976).
7. Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 273 U.S. 702 (1926).
8. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, § 801(d)(2)(E)[01], 801-143
(1977).
9. To establish the existence of a conspiracy for purposes of the co-conspirator rule, the
elements of the crime of conspiracy (iLe., meeting of the minds, criminal intent and an overt act)
need not be shown. Rather, a sufficient showing must be made of a partnership in the illegal
activity.
10. The most frequent issue arising under the "in the course of the conspiracy" requirement
is whether arrest terminates the conspiracy. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949);
United States v. Care, 569 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Di Rodio, 565 F.2d 573 (9th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Testa, 548 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1977). For a case considering when
conspiracy ends, see United States v. Kahan, 572 F.2d 923, 935-36 (2d Cir. 1978). For a case
treating withdrawal from the conspiracy, see United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1121 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1028 (1970).
II. The requirement that the statement be in furtherance of the conspiracy has been gener-
ously applied. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, § 801(d)(2)(E) [01], 801-
146-47 (1977). But see the analysis of the "in furtherance" requirement in United States v. Man-
gan, 575 F.2d 32, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1978).
12. 28 U.S.C. app., FED. RULE EvID. 801, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT 93-1277.
See also United States v. Buschman, 527 F.2d 1082, 1084 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Olweiss,
138 F.2d 798, 800 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 744 (1943).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
existence of the conspiracy and the defendant's par-
ticipation in it?
Rule 104 of the Federal Rules of Evidence' 3 offers some guidance
regarding the correct procedure by delineating the function of judge
and jury in deciding issues of preliminary fact. Under the rule, the
judge is to determine the admissibility of evidence, except when the
relevancy of the evidence is dependent upon a factual determination by
the jury. Despite the failure of some courts to consider the impact of
rule 104 on admissions of co-conspirator statements under rule
801(d)(2)(E), a majority of the federal courts have adopted a procedure
whereby the judge decides whether or not to admit declarations of joint
venturers.
Integrally related to the question of who decides to admit the re-
marks of co-conspirators is the question of the appropriate standard of
proof to be met by the evidence which shows a joint venture. Neither
rule 801(d)(2)(E) nor rule 104 offers a definitive answer to the burden
of proof issue. Consequently, there is a disparity between the standards
of proof exacted by different federal courts. Presently, a trend is be-
coming apparent as more circuit courts of appeals adopt a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard.
This note will describe the ways in which the various federal cir-
cuit courts of appeals have construed the Federal Rules of Evidence to
affect admission of co-conspirator declarations.' 4 It will then suggest
the preferable resolutions to the questions of whether the judge or jury
should decide to admit statements of co-conspirators and whether the
admission should be based on a standard of beyond a reasonable
13. The rule provides that:
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the qualifica-
tion of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evi-
dence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In
making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with re-
spect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy conditioned onfact. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the
fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the intro-
duction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.
(c) Hearing ofjury. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all cases be
conducted out of the hearing of thejury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be
so conducted when the interests ofjustice require or, when an accused is a witness, if he
so requests.
(d) Testimony by accused. The accused does not, by testifying upon ,;a preliminary
matter, subject himself to cross-examination as to other issues in the case.
(e) Weight and credibility. This rule does not limit the right of a party to introduce
before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility.
FED. R. EVID. 104 [hereinafter referred to as rule 1041.
14. Cf. White, The Preliminary Question of the Existence of Conspiracy/or Admitting State-
ments Under Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) and 104(a). The Continuing Vitality of the
Federal Common Law of Evidence 21 ATLA L. REP. 309 (1978) (illustrating that the codified
Federal Rules of Evidence nevertheless allow for judicial interpretation).
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doubt, a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie showing or sub-
stantial evidence.' 5
ADMISSIBILITY OF DECLARATIONS: JUDGE OR JURY QUESTION
Traditionally, a trial judge could allow co-conspirator declarations
to be introduced upon the condition that subsequent evidence shows a
conspiracy and connects the defendant to it. The jury often was given a
cautionary instruction that, until such further proof was made, the
statement could only be used against the declarant. 16 At the close of
the case, if the judge was satisfied that there was evidence of the de-
fendant's involvement in a conspiracy sufficient to admit the statement
of a co-conspirator, he or she would resubmit the admissibility issue to
the jury. The jury was told it could consider the declaration against the
co-conspirator defendant only after it concluded that a conspiracy ex-
isted and that the statement was made in the course of and in further-
ance of the conspiracy. 17
Although rule 10438 now governs consideration of preliminary
questions or conditions which must be met for rule 801(d)(2)(E) to ap-
ply, it has not fully resolved the problem of whether it is the judge or
the jury who should decide if a declarant's statements may be consid-
ered against an alleged co-conspirator. Rule 104(a) states that prelimi-
nary questions about the admissibility of evidence are to be decided by
the judge and that he or she generally need not be bound by the rules
of evidence. Rule 104(b) deals with preliminary questions about the
relevancy of evidence. When the relevancy depends on showing a con-
dition of fact, the judge must admit the evidence subject to a jury find-
ing that the condition was fulfilled. 19
15. It is not the purpose of this note to question the validity of the rule. For a discussion of
this question see generally Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1159 (1954); Com-
ment, The Co-Conspirator Exception to the Hearsay Rule. The Limits of ts Logic, 37 LA. L. REV.
1101 (1977). Nor is it within the purview of the topic to describe challenges which have been
made to the co-conspirator rule of evidence on the grounds of the accused's sixth amendment right
to confront witnesses testifying against him. For a description of such challenges see generally
Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions.
A Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1378 (1972); Garland & Snow, The Co-Conspirators
Exception to the Hearsay Rule. Procedural Implementation and Confrontation Clause
Requirements, 63 J. CRIM. L. 1 (1972); Younger, Confrontation and Hearsay. A Look Backward A
Peek Forward, I HOFSTRA L. REV. 32 (1973).
16. 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, § 104[051, 104-43 n.17 (1977).
17. See text accompanying note 59 infra.
18. For the text of rule 104 see note 13 supra.
19. The Advisory Committee's Note makes clear the procedure intended under rule 104(b).
That Note states:
The judge makes a preliminary determination whether the foundation evidence is suffi-
cient to support a finding of fulfillment of the condition. If so, the item is admitted. If
after all the evidence on the issue is in, pro and con, the jury could reasonably conclude
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Rules 104(a) and (b) have not conclusively settled the judge/jury
issue because the admissibility of co-conspirator declarations can be
characterized as dependent on the competency of the evidence or as
dependent on a finding of conditional relevancy. If one views a co-
conspirator's statement as relevant to the defendant's guilt, but barred
until it is found to be reliable (competent) enough to warrant admis-
sion, rule 104(a) prescribes that the preliminary question is for the
judge to determine, as are other hearsay or privilege questions. On the
other hand, if one views the co-conspirator's statement as irrelevant to
the defendant's guilt, and therefore inadmissible, unless he is first
found to be part of the conspiracy, rule 104(b) requires that the prelimi-
nary question of relevancy be decided by the jury.20
Determination by Judge
Since the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence, several courts
have addressed the effect of rule 104 on the question of who decides if
rule 801(d)(2)(E), the co-conspirator rule of evidence, applies in a given
case. The United States Courts of Appeals for the First,2 1 Fifth,22
Sixth, 23 Seventh, 24 and Eighth 25 Circuits have ruled that rule 104(a)
requires that the judge decide if preliminary conditions have been met
before admitting a co-conspirator's declarations. The Second 26 and
Ninth 27 Circuits held that the trial judge was responsible for admitting
such statements, long before the new rules went into effect. The Third
Circuit 28 also has held that the judge must decide the admissibility of
co-conspirator statements, although it did not rely on rule 104.
Reliance on Rule 104(a)
The first court to consider the applicability of the new rules to the
procedure for admitting co-conspirator declarations was the United
that fulfillment of the condition is not established, the issue is for them. If the evidence is
not such as to allow a finding, the judge withdraws the matter from their consideration.
28 U.S.C. app., Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules [of Evid.], Rule 104, Subdivision
(b) (1976).
20. 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, § 104[05], 104-40 (1977).
21. United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977).
22. United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1978), rehearing en banc, 590 F.2d 575
(5th Cir. 1979).
23. United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1978).
24. United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978).
25. United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1978).
26. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), ail'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
27. Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
28. United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977).
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States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in United States v.
Petrozziello.29 In that case, the appellant challenged the sufficiency of
the independent nonhearsay evidence showing a conspiracy between
himself and the man who sold narcotics to drug agents. Petroziello
claimed that the dealer's remark to the agents that Petrozziello was his
connection should not have been admitted under the co-conspirator
rule. Although the appellant did not challenge the procedure followed
for determining admissibility of the dealer's statement to the agents, the
reviewing court nevertheless examined what had happened at trial.
The trial judge had insisted that the government present all of its
nonhearsay proof before he ruled on whether that evidence supported
admission of the co-conspirator statement. However, at the close of the
case, he had allowed the jury to weigh the admissibility of the declara-
tion. The appellate court concluded that rule 104(a) changed the way
in which the traditional co-conspirator hearsay exception was to be ap-
plied in the First Circuit. Whereas the jury formerly decided whether
or not to invoke the co-conspirator rule, admissibility now was solely
for the trial judge to decide. 30
A similar conclusion was reached in the recent Fifth Circuit case
of United States v. James,3' where the appellants claimed to have been
entitled to a pretrial hearing, out of the jury's presence, at which the
judge would rule on the admissibility of co-conspirator declarations.
Instead, the trial judge followed traditional practice in the Fifth Circuit
whereby the judge and the jury shared the role of admitting such state-
ments. The judge made a preliminary determination that the evidence,
independent of the disputed statement, was sufficient to support a jury
finding that a conspiracy existed and that the declarant and defendants
were members. A cautionary instruction was given to the jury when
the co-conspirator declaration was introduced. When the case was sub-
mitted to the jury, it was again instructed that it could not consider the
statement against a defendant unless it first found the conspiracy ex-
isted, the defendant and declarant participated in it, and the statement
was made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Thus,
the jury decided for itself whether the conditions for admitting the re-
mark of a co-conspirator had been met. The Fifth Circuit, in reviewing
29. 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977).
30. Although the prescribed method for admitting a co-conspirator's statement was not ob-
served by the trial court in Petrozziello, the reviewing court refused to overturn the verdict because
the procedure had not been challenged as error and because the additional fact-finding by the jury
could hardly prejudice the appellant. Id at 23.
31. 576 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1978), rehearing en banc, 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979).
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the case, noted the possible prejudice to a defendant when the jury
hears statements made by an alleged co-conspirator before the admissi-
bility of the declaration has been determined. 32 It held that rule 104(a)
now requires the judge alone to decide whether co-conspirator declara-
tions are admissible. 33
Likewise, in United States v. Enright,34 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that rule 104(a) governs admission
of co-conspirator statements. After being convicted of conspiracy to
violate gambling laws, the police chief defendant objected to the intro-
duction at trial of several recorded conversations in which he was im-
plicated in the conspiracy by a co-defendant. At trial, the judge
initially admitted the taped conversations, but later instructed the jury
that it was to find the conspiracy existed and that Enright was a mem-
ber of it before it could take into consideration the recorded statements.
The court of appeals disapproved the use of such a confusing and in-
consistent jury instruction when it held that rule 104(a) was applicable
to the admission of co-conspirator declarations. 35
In United States v. Santiago,36 the Seventh Circuit also concluded
that rule 104(a) requires the trial judge to decide the admissibility of
joint venturer declarations. Before trial, the defendant had submitted a
motion in limine to exclude the use of statements made by his alleged
partners in the heroin sale. The motion was denied after the judge con-
ducted a hearing and made a finding that the existence of the conspir-
acy had been established sufficiently to permit the jury to hear the
declarations. When the statements were introduced at trial, the jury
was cautioned as to the limited use it could make of the remarks until
each juror was independently convinced that a conspiracy existed. The
jury was again instructed to this effect before it began its deliberations.
On appeal, Santiago objected that the judge did not specifically rule on
the admissibility of the statements. The Seventh Circuit found it un-
necessary, in the absence of new evidence, for the judge to reconsider at
trial the same proof he had previously considered in ruling on the mo-
tion in limine.37 The reviewing court found no error in the procedure of
resubmitting the admissibility question to the jury, but noted that in
future cases such a practice would be undesirable. 38
32. Id at 1129-30, 590 F.2d at 579.
33. Id at 1130, 590 F.2d at 579-80.
34. 579 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1978).
35. Id at 984, 987.
36. 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978).
37. Id at 1131.
38. Id at 1136.
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The case of United States v. Bell,39 provided the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit with the opportunity to con-
sider whether the judge or jury should admit co-conspirator remarks.
There the appellant, convicted of selling two sawed-off shotguns with-
out paying the transfer tax, challenged the admissibility of remarks ex-
changed during telephone conversations between undercover agents
and the man who arranged the gun sale. The court found the state-
ments to be admissible as co-conspirator declarations. It further set
forth its view that rule 104 requires the judge to preliminarily make a
formal finding of the admissibility of co-conspirator statements out of
the jury's hearing before the jury may consider the remarks against the
defendant.4n
Each of these five recent opinions indicates that rule 104(a) re-
quires that the trial judge, rather than the jury, decide whether co-con-
spirator declarations are admissible against a defendant. However, the
original case relying on rule 104(a), United States v. Petrozziello,41 re-
stricted the role of the jury in deciding the admissibility question with-
out closely examining the applicability of rule 104(b) to co-conspirator
remarks.42 The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Bell43 merely
adopted rule 104(a) on the strength of the First Circuit's Petrozziello
decision, and failed to consider the interplay between rules 104(a) and
104(b). While the Sixth Circuit recognized that either rule 104(a) or
104(b) might apply to the preliminary question of admitting co-con-
spirator statements, it concluded that the issue is "one of the basic relia-
bility and fairness of admitting the evidence rather than a relevancy
question"' a without considering the policy reasons underlying its
choice.
Finally, in United States v. James,45 the Fifth Circuit carefully an-
alyzed the preliminary question of admitting co-conspirator statements.
The court recognized that admissibility could be viewed as a question
either of the competency of the evidence or of conditional relevancy.
The opinion reasoned that rule 104(a) should apply, since allowing the
jury to decide admissibility as a question of conditional relevancy
under rule 104(b) might prejudice the defendant. It felt it is unrealistic
39. 573 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1978).
40. Id at 1043, 1044. In view of the newly enunciated policy, the trial court's failure to make
a formal finding of admissibility was not plain error.
41. 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977).
42. Id. at 22.
43. 573 F.2d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 1978).
44. United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 984 (6th Cir. 1978).
45. 576 F.2d 1121, 1128-30 (5th Cir. 1978). See also rehearing en banc, 590 F.2d 575, 579-80
(5th Cir. 1979).
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to expect a jury to be able to decide the admissibility of co-conspirator
declarations before it considers those statements against the defendant
in deciding his or her guilt. If the jury fails to make the two-step deter-
mination, the defendant may well be prejudiced by co-conspirator
statements which are decidedly relevant but which have never been
ruled admissible.
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Santiago,4 6 also construed
the admission of co-conspirator statements to be a question of the relia-
bility of the evidence for the judge to decide under rule 104(a), rather
than a question of conditional relevancy. In rejecting a jury determina-
tion under rule 104(b), that court observed that it is a near impossibility
for jurors to mentally isolate the co-conspirator remarks while they de-
cide the admissibility of these statements.
Without Reliance on the Rules of Evidence
Both the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and
Ninth Circuits decided, long before the enactment of the new Federal
Rules of Evidence, that it was more logical for the trial judge to deter-
mine the admissibility of co-conspirator declarations. The underlying
logic of both courts was best expressed by Judge Learned Hand, in the
Second Circuit case of United States v. Dennis.47 In Dennis, Judge
Hand noted that even if a jury could consider such statements sepa-
rately until it had concluded the declarations were competent evi-
dence,48
[iut is difficult to see what value the declarations could have as proof
of the conspiracy, if before using them the jury had to be satisfied
that the declarant and the accused were engaged in the conspiracy
charged; for upon that hypothesis the declarations would merely
serve to confirm what the jury had already decided. In strict logic
these instructions in effect altogether withdrew the declarations from
the jury, and it was idle to put them in at all.49
Likewise, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in Carbo v. United States50 established its position that the judge alone
should decide the admissibility of co-conspirator declarations. Once
such statements are admitted into evidence against a defendant, the
jury is not instructed to reconsider the independent proof of the de-
fendant's involvement in the conspiracy before attributing the remark
to him.
46. 582 F.2d at 1128, 1131-33 (7th Cir. 1978).
47. 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), af'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
48. Id. at 230.
49. Id. at 230-31.
50. 314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
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In the more recent case of United States v. Stanchich,5' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, without relying on rule
104, reaffirmed its long-standing view that it is for the judge alone to
determine admissibility of co-conspirator statements. 52 The court re-
lied on the reasoning, first set out by Judge Learned Hand, that it is
more logical that the judge decide the admissibility of co-conspirator
statements just as he or she generally decides fact issues on which the
competence of evidence depends.
Since the new Federal Rules of Evidence have been in effect, the
Third Circuit has also considered the question of whether the judge or
the jury admits co-conspirator declarations. Viewing the applicability
of the co-conspirator rule as a question of competence of the evidence,
the court held in United States v. Trowery53 that the trial judge alone
must determine the admissibility of co-conspirator statements as a mat-
ter of law.-4 Although it framed the issue as one of the competence or
reliability of the declaration, the court did not base its holding on rule
104(a). Instead, its holding was based on prior case law which ulti-
mately referred to the logic of the seminal cases of Carbo and Dennis.55
Determination by Jury
Although none of the circuits has found specifically that rule
104(b) requires the jury to admit co-conspirator statements,5 6 in prac-
tice, the jury often is instructed to decide if a conspiracy existed and if
the defendant was a member before it may consider the declaration
against the defendant. This dual determination by the judge and jury
is the traditional way in which the prerequisites for admitting co-con-
spirator statements have been assessed. In at least one circuit, trial
practice and standard jury instructions continue to favor a jury decision
on the applicability of co-conspirator declarations.5 7 A typical instruc-
tion to the jury recites:
51. 550 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1977).
52. Id at 1297-98, citing United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1028 (1970).
53. 542 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1976).
54. Id at 626-27.
55. See text accompanying notes 47-50 supra.
56. Until its recent ruling in United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1978), rehearing
en banc, 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
seemed disposed to view rule 104(b) as requiring the jury to decide if a co-conspirator's statement
is admissible. The court had noted, in a footnote, that admissibility of co-conspirator declarations
"depends... on the existence of a conspiracy, a 'fulfillment of a condition of fact' similar to that
described in Rule 104(b)." United States v. Ochoa, 564 F.2d 1155, 1157 n.2 (5th Cir. 1977).
57. See United States v. Gutierrez, 576 F.2d 269, 274 (10th Cir. 1978); Dennis v. United
States, 346 F.2d 10, 16 (10th Cir. 1965), rev'don other grounds, 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
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If it is established beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy ex-
isted, and that the defendant was one of its members, then the acts
and declarations of any other member of such conspiracy in or out of
such defendant's presence, done in furtherance of the objects of the
conspiracy, and during its existence, may be considered as evidence
against such defendant. 58
In addition, although trial courts in certain circuits maintain that
the judge must rule on co-conspirator statements, these courts in prac-
tice often resubmit the determination of whether the defendant was
part of a conspiracy to the jury before allowing it to consider a declara-
tion against a co-conspirator/defendant. 59 This inconsistent policy
seems to be most prevalent in the circuits which ruled prior to the en-
actment of the new Federal Rules of Evidence that the judge was to
decide the preliminary questions upon which the admission of co-con-
spirator statements is dependent. Thus, on occasion, several circuits
have continued to permit the judge to admit co-conspirator declara-
tions, subject to a later jury finding that the conspiracy existed and the
defendant participated in it.
Recommendation
Preliminary review by the trial judge before admission of co-con-
spirator statements is not only more reasonable than to leave the deter-
mination to the jury, but it is also required by rule 104(a). Although it
initially appears that either rule 104(a) or rule 104(b) could control the
division of responsibility between judge and jury in admitting co-con-
spirator declarations pursuant to rule 801(d)(2)(E), 60 closer analysis of
the rationale behind rule 104 indicates that rule 104(a) requires the
judge to make such decisions.
It is unrealistic to expect a jury to engage in the two-step process of
deciding the admissibility of a co-conspirator declaration before decid-
ing the defendant's guilt, as rule 104(b) would require. Judge Learned
Hand observed that "it is a practical impossibility for laymen, and for
that matter for most judges, to keep their minds in the isolated com-
partments. . ." which are necessary if they are to ignore a co-conspira-
tor's declaration while they consider the independent evidence of the
conspiracy. 61 However, if the jury is unable to analyze the evidence on
58. LaBuy, Jury Instructions in Federal Criminal Cases, § 10.00, 36 F.R.D. 457, 502 (1965).
See also E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, § 27.06 (3d
ed. 1977).
59. United States v. Kahan, 572 F.2d 923, 936 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Mitchell, 556
F.2d 371, 377 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 925 (1977); United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 849
(9th Cir. 1976).
60. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
61. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 231 (2d Cir. 1950), affid, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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these two levels, the admissibility question will never be formally re-
solved. Even were the jury to go through the motions of assessing the
evidence of the conspiracy before admitting the co-conspirator state-
ment, its decision is nevertheless likely to have been colored by having
heard the statement.
By obligating the judge to determine the admissibility of co-con-
spirator statements, rule 104(a) seeks to avoid the prejudice to a de-
fendant which would occur if a jury relied upon the declarations
without independently deciding their admissibility. 62 Only by having
the judge initially determine the admissibility of a co-conspirator's
statement can such prejudice be prevented. The Advisory Committee's
Note indicates that the preliminary questions of conditional relevancy,
reserved for the jury by rule 104(b), are issues of fact well within the
ability of a jury to resolve by using common sense.63 The risk of
prejudice to the defendant is not present in most relevancy determina-
tions, as it is in determinations of the admissibility of co-conspirator
statements which can be prejudicial precisely because they are relevant.
Thus, an analysis of the policy behind rule 104 reveals that to avoid
prejudicing the defendant, rule 104(a) requires the judge to consider
the preliminary prerequisites and decide whether co-conspirator decla-
rations are to be admitted into evidence. 64
A second reason why the trial judge, rather than the jury, should
decide admissibility of co-conspirator statements becomes evident in
cases where the defendant is charged with the crime of conspiracy. In
such cases, the ultimate issue of guilt coincides with the preliminary
issues to be resolved prior to admission of co-conspirator utterances. A
jury which is instructed to preliminarily find the existence of a conspir-
acy and the defendant's participation in it by the same "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" standard used to decide guilt, will have already decided
the ultimate issue of conspiracy without benefit of the co-conspirator
declarations. This procedure would restrict the usefulness of admissi-
ble co-conspirator statements to cases in which a defendant was
charged with a substantive offense. This anomalous result surely runs
counter to the purpose of rule 801(d)(2)(E) which renders extrajudicial
62. See United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121, 1129-30(5th Cir. 1978), rehearing en banc, 590
F.2d 575, 579 (5th Cir. 1979).
63. 28 U.S.C. app., Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules [of Evid.], Rule 104,
Subdivision (b) (1976). The Advisory Committee gives as an example of a question of conditional
relevancy a statement introduced to prove X was on notice. The statement is irrelevant unless X
heard it.
64. But see Kessler, The Treatment of Preliminary Issues of Fact in Conspiracy Litigations:
Putting the Conspiracy Back Into The Co-Conspirator Rule, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77 (1976) (analysis
concluding that rule 104(b) governs admission of co-conspirator statements).
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statements made by a fellow conspirator admissible as nonhearsay, in
part, because of the nature of the crime of conspiracy. 65
Resolution of the judge/jury question does not clarify how the
judge is to admit co-conspirator declarations. Although courts have
long allowed co-conspirator statements to be introduced subject to sub-
sequent connection of the defendant to the conspiracy, 66 the wiser
method for admitting such testimony is for the judge to rule on the
preliminary issues before a witness testifies to such declarations. In this
way, prejudice to the defendant or the need to declare a mistrial may
be avoided should the sum of the evidence fail to show a conspiracy
existed or that the defendant participated in it.
The judge may insure that the jury does not hear a co-conspirator
statement until it is properly deemed admissible in a number of ways:
(1) by ordering that all independent proof of the conspiracy be
presented before a proffer of co-conspirator statements is made,6 7 (2) by
conducting a pretrial hearing into the anticipated independent proof of
the conspiracy and the anticipated proof in rebuttal,68 or (3) by con-
ducting a like hearing, outside the presence of the jury, when it appears
that, to answer a question, a witness must recount an out-of-court state-
ment of a co-conspirator.69 Limiting the jury's exposure to co-conspir-
65. See text accompanying notes 6-8 supra.
66. This procedure was followed in United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1977),
and reflects the rule that the order of proof is generally within the discretion of the trial court. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently suggested that district courts within
its jurisdiction conditionally admit co-conspirator statements. It set forth the following procedure
for courts to follow:
[O]n the record, [out of the jury's presence] caution the parties (a) that the statement is
being admitted subject to defendant's objection; (b) that thegovernment will be required
to prove by a preponderance of the independent evidence that the statement was made
by a co-conspirator during the course an in urtherance of the conspiracy; (c) that at the
conclusion of all the evidence the court will make an explicit determination for the rec-
ord regarding the admissibility of the statement; and (d) that if the court determines that
the government has failed to carry [its] burden . . .the court will . . . declare a mistrial,
unless a cautionary instruction to the jury to disregard the statement would suffice to
cure any prejudice.
United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1978).
67. Chief Judge Coffin observed in United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 n.3 (1st Cir.
1977) that the district judge had so ordered. Upon rehearing en banc of United States v. James,
590 F.2d 575, 581-82 (5th Cir. 1979), the court indicated that preferred practice in the Fifth Circuit
will be for the trial judge to order that the nonhearsay proof be presented before co-conspirator
declarations. A problem in this approach is that the court will not have had a chance to hear the
defendant's case before it must rule on the admissibility of the co-conspirator statements. If the
circuit has adopted a standard of proof by a preponderance of the evidence or beyond a reason-
able doubt, the judge's ruling must wait until he has considered any evidence in rebuttal of the
conspiracy which is presented by the defendant.
68. In United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978), the court held a pretrial
hearing, out of the presence of the jury, so that the judge could determine the admissibility of co-
conspirator declarations. A drawback to this procedure is that the lengthy proof often required to
be presented at the hearing would have to be repeated at trial before a jury.
69. This practice is similar to that required by the court in United States v. James, 576 F.2d
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ator declarations in these ways, until after the judge has conclusively
admitted them, serves to avoid prejudice to the defendant and to avoid
confusing the jury over temporary cautionary instructions restricting
the use of "hearsay" statements to the declarant. It also prevents leav-
ing the jury with the impression that, after hearing further evidence, the
judge decided the defendant was a member of a conspiracy. 70
ADMISSION OF DECLARATIONS: STANDARD OF PROOF
Aside from the question of whether the judge or jury should de-
cide if a co-conspirator's declaration is admissible, there remains the
troublesome question of the standard of proof which the prosecution
must meet in establishing the existence of a conspiracy and the defend-
ant's connection with it. Unless the proper burden of proof is met and
the statements are shown to have been made in the course of and in
furtherance of the conspiracy, co-conspirator declarations may not be
admitted against a defendant.7 ' Determination of the proper standard
of proof on the admissibility question often is complicated by the fact
that a separate burden of persuasion (ie. beyond a reasonable doubt)
exists for deciding the ultimate issue of guilt in criminal conspiracy
cases.
72
It has been well accepted that the defendant's participation in the
conspiracy must be shown by evidence independent of the statement
itself.73 The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that "decla-
rations [of co-conspirators] are admissible . . . only if there is proof
aliunde that he [the defendant] is connected with the conspiracy.
Otherwise hearsay would lift itself by its own bootstraps to the level of
competent evidence."'74 It is this independent proof requirement which
generally is the crucial element in determining whether a co-conspira-
tor's statement is admissible. Challenges to the sufficiency of the in-
1121 (5th Cir. 1978). To safeguard a defendant's right against undue prejudice and to avoid jury
confusion, the court held that rule 104(c) required a judge to both determine admissibility of co-
conspirator declarations and to conduct any hearings necessary for that determination outside the
presence of the jury. Id. at 1132. However, this holding was withdrawn during the rehearing en
banc, 590 F.2d 575, 577 (5th Cir. 1979).
70. See United States v. Allegretti, 340 F.2d 243, 245 (7th Cir. 1964) in which, as part of a
jury instruction, the trial judge stated, "I now rule that the Government has sustained its avowed
burden and has shown to the satisfaction of the Court that a connection does exist between each
such act, conversation and statement [out of the defendant's presence] and the several defend-
ants." The appellate court approved the instruction. 340 F.2d at 256 (7th Cir. 1964).
71. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) and text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.
72. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 341, 798-99 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972).
73. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
74. Id. at 74-75 (citations omitted).
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dependent evidence account for a major portion of convictions
appealed on the basis of co-conspirator declarations.
However, neither rule 801(d)(2)(E) nor the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence in their entirety indicate the burden of proof which the in-
dependent evidence of the conspiracy must meet. Nor has the United
States Supreme Court answered the question of the appropriate stan-
dard of proof for admitting co-conspirator declarations. As a result,
the various federal circuit courts of appeals differ widely on the quan-
tum of proof required to sufficiently show a defendant's participation in
the conspiracy. They range from a strict beyond reasonable doubt
standard,75 to a fair preponderance of the evidence standard, 76 to a
standard of a prima facie showing, 77 and to a mere substantial in-
dependent evidence standard. 78 Of the circuits which have had occa-
sion to review the burden for admitting co-conspirator declarations
since the new rules of evidence were enacted, five have modified their
prior standard of proof.79 Other circuits have either reaffirmed the
quantum of evidence previously required or have not adequately come
to terms with the problem under rules 801(d)(2)(E) and 104.80
Substantial Independent Evidence
While the United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed
the question of the appropriate standard of proof for admission of co-
conspirator declarations, in United States v. Nixon,8 ' the Court dis-
cussed in dictum the requisite quantum of evidence for co-conspirator
remarks to be admissible against another defendant. The trial judge
must be satisfied that a "sufficient showing, by independent evidence,
of a conspiracy among one or more other defendants and the declarant
[has been made and that] the declarations at issue were in furtherance
of that conspiracy. ' 82 The Court noted that "as [a] preliminary matter,
there must be substantial, independent evidence of the conspiracy, at
75. See text accompanying notes 129-33 infra.
76. See text accompanying notes 100-28 infra.
77. See text accompanying notes 88-99 infra.
78. See text accompanying notes 82-87 infra.
79. United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Enright, 579
F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1978), rehearing en banc,
590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977).
80. United States v. Dixon, 562 F.2d 1138 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Stanchich, 550
F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Trotter, 529 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1976).
81. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). The Court's observation arose when it noted that co-conspirator
statements were one basis on which the subpoenaed material of the President might be admissible
as evidence.
82. Id. at 701.
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least enough to take the question to the jury."83
Although this is the United States Supreme Court's most definitive
statement on the quantum of evidence necessary to admit co-conspira-
tor statements, "substantial independent evidence"8 4 is a somewhat
ambiguous standard. The Court likened it to the prima facie stan-
dard85 when it remarked that there must be enough independent proof
of the conspiracy to submit the question to the jury. Whether this bur-
den is lower than standards of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a
preponderance of the evidence is not clear from the Court's statement.
Yet, because of its similarity to the prima facie standard, it is likely that




A prima facie case is considered to be proved if the evidence (un-
less rebutted by sufficient evidence to the contrary) is adequate to sup-
port a finding but does not compel a conclusion based on it.87 It is the
standard usually employed by the judge to decide if there is enough
evidence to overcome a motion for directed verdict.8 8 Therefore, if ad-
mission of co-conspirator's statements depends upon proof of a prima
facie case, the independent proof must create reasonable inferences
sufficient to support a finding that there was a conspiracy and that the
defendant and the declarant participated in it.
83. Id. at 701 n.14. This burden of proof was adopted by the court in United States v. James,
rehearing en banc, 590 F.2d 575, 581 (5th Cir. 1979), as the preliminary standard of proof neces-
sary if a co-conspirator's statement is to be admitted at the close of the prosecution's case.
84. In the well-reasoned decision, United States v. Herrera, 407 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. I11. 1975),
Judge Marshall adopted the standard of proof suggested by the United States Supreme Court.
"Declarations of alleged co-conspirators are admissible against a defendant if there is substantial
independent evidence from which a reasonable mind could infer the existence of a conspiracy or
joint venture and the defendant's connection therewith." Id. at 773.
85. See text accompanying notes 88-99 infra.
86. Proof by substantial independent evidence or by a prima facie showing has generally
been deemed the least onerous burden of proof. See United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1044
(8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Trotter, 529 F.2d 806, 812 (3d Cir. 1976). However, United States
Courts of Appeals for the Second and Fifth Circuits regard a prima facie standard, or one in
which there is enough evidence to submit a case to the jury, as the most onerous burden of proof.
Those courts seem to view a prima facie showing as equivalent to a showing beyond a reasonable
doubt. See United States v. Wiley, 519 F.2d 1348, 1350-51 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Oliva,
497 F.2d 130, 132-33 (5th Cir. 1974). Since, for submission of a case to the jury, both circuits
require that the evidence must be able to satisfy a reasonable juror beyond a reasonable doubt, the
courts apparently reason that such prima facie evidence must compel a finding of conspiracy be-
yond a reasonable doubt, rather than merely support a finding of conspiracy beyond a reasonable
doubt.
87. Garland & Snow, The Co-Conspirators Exception to the Hearsay Rule. Procedural Imple-
mentation and Confrontation Clause Requirements, 63 J. CRIM. L. 1, 8 (1972).
88. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 338, 789-90 (2d ed. E. Cleary
ed. 1972).
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Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, when the
jury commonly was instructed to redetermine the admissibility of co-
conspirator statements, the majority of courts required that the judge
initially find prima facie proof of the conspiracy and the defendant's
involvement in it.89 However, since the new rules have been in effect, a
a number of courts of appeals have abandoned the burden of prima
facie proof and have adopted the higher standard of proof by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.90 Only the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit,9 ' has elected to retain the prima facie standard for
admitting co-conspirator declarations after having considered the ques-
tion in light of the new Federal Rules of Evidence.
The Ninth Circuit requires that a prima facie case of conspiracy
must be established by the close of the government's case in order to
admit co-conspirator statements. That court has clearly defined its
prima facie standard as not requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the 1963 decision, Carbo v. United States,9 2 the court declared that
"[t]he test is not whether the defendants' connection had by independ-
ent evidence been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether, ac-
cepting the independent evidence as credible, the judge is satisfied that
a prima facie case (one which would support a finding) has been
made." 93 In the recent case of United States v. Dixon,94 the Ninth Cir-
cuit reiterated the quantum of evidence it requires as "substantial in-
dependent evidence, other than hearsay. . . enough to make a prima
facie case."' 95 The evidence need not be unchallenged, since in deter-
mining a prima facie case the court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution. 96 Furthermore, that same court in
United States v. Calaway9 7 has held that once the existence of a con-
spiracy is clearly established by a prima facie showing, a defendant's
complicity in the conspiracy need only be shown by slight evidence. 98
89. United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1131-32 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. En-
right, 579 F.2d 980, 983 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121, 1127 (5th Cir.
1978), rehearing en banc, 590 F.2d 575, 578 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040,
1044 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977); Carbo v. United
States, 314 F.2d 718, 737 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
90. See text accompanying notes 100-28 infra.
91. See United States v. Dixon, 562 F.2d 1138 (9th Cir. 1977).
92. 314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
93. Id at 737.
94. 562 F.2d 1138 (9th Cir. 1977).
95. Id at 1141, quoting United States v. Calaway, 524 F.2d 609, 612 (9th Cir. 1975). See also
United States v. Avila-Macias, 577 F.2d 1384, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Testa, 548
F.2d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 1977).
96. 562 F.2d at 1141.
97. 524 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976).
98. Id at 612, 615.
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The Ninth Circuit has stressed that the quantum of prima facie
proof required to admit co-conspirator declarations falls below beyond
a reasonable doubt standard. In rejecting that high burden, the court
implicitly acknowledges that co-conspirator statements would be of lit-
tle benefit if, initially, the independent proof had to show a conspiracy
existed beyond a reasonable doubt. The choice of the prima facie stan-
dard seems to reflect the fact that a similar weighing of evidence occurs
when a judge decides a motion for directed verdict on a conspiracy
charge as when he or she decides the admissibility of co-conspirator
declarations. In both instances, the judge must find that the prosecu-
tion's proof reasonably supports a finding that the defendant partici-
pated in a conspiracy. The prima facie standard for admitting co-
conspirator utterances may defy exact definition. Nevertheless, the la-
bel closely approximates the amount of evidence which a judge actu-
ally needs to consider in order to sufficiently convince him- or herself
that co-conspirator declarations are admissible.
Preponderance of Evidence Standard
A preponderance of the evidence standard, which is the common
burden of persuasion in civil cases, 99 generally requires that the evi-
dence in support of the contested fact is more convincing or of greater
weight than the opposing evidence.'0 If the criterion for admission of
co-conspirator statements is proof by a preponderance of the evidence,
the test would be met if the evidence as a whole showed that the con-
spiracy and the defendant's connection to it were more probable than
not.
Five United States Courts of Appeals, the First,' 0 ' Fifth, 0 2
Sixth, 0 3 Seventh,' °4 and Eighth'05 Circuits, recently changed the bur-
den of proof required for admission of co-conspirator statements to a
preponderance of the evidence standard. In the view of those courts,
this standard is a higher burden than the prima facie standard which
was previously required. 10 6 Each court decided that the higher stan-
99. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 339, 793-94 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972).
100. Id
101. United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977).
102. United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1978), rehearing en bane, 590 F.2d 575
(5th Cir. 1979).
103. United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1978).
104. United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978).
105. United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1978).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977). United States v.
Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1978).
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dard of proof was necessary since rule 104(a) requires the trial judge to
make a conclusive determination of the admissibility of co-conspirator
declarations. To require only a prima facie showing was logical when
the jury had the responsibility of determining anew the admissibility of
co-conspirator statements. Now, however, since the judge alone must
admit such statements, to require him or her to find it "more likely than
not that the declarant and the defendant were members of a conspiracy
when the hearsay statement was made, and that the statement was in
furtherance of the conspiracy," 0 7 sets the standard high enough to ade-
quately protect the defendant, but "not so high as to exclude trustwor-
thy relevant evidence."' 0 8
During a recent rehearing of United States v. James,10 9 the Fifth
Circuit set forth a unique combination of burdens of proof which must
now be met before co-conspirator declarations may be admitted. The
Fifth Circuit's new two-tier test requires that the trial judge find sub-
stantial, independent evidence of the conspiracy at the end of the gov-
ernment's case. Once the judge has admitted the co-conspirator
statement, he or she must again weigh the independent evidence at the
end of the trial and determine by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant was a member of a conspiracy and the statement was
made in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Although this
approach appears to require initially a lesser quantum of evidence, the
ultimate burden of proof in the Fifth Circuit remains a preponderance
of the evidence.
Although these five circuit courts of appeals agree on the burden
of proof to be met by a party seeking admission of co-conspirator state-
ments, they disagree on whether the burden must be met by considera-
tion only of the independent evidence. Rule 104(a) allows a judge to
consider hearsay and other inadmissible evidence when preliminarily
determining the admissibility of co-conspirator declarations. 0 The
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in United States v.
Martorano,"'I noted that rule 104(a) may allow the judge to consider
the very statement seeking admission when he or she weighs the evi-
dence of a conspiracy. Using the declaration itself to contribute to the
107. United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (lst Cir. 1977).
108. United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121, 1130 (5th Cir. 1978).
109. 590 F.2d 575, 580-83 (5th Cir. 1979).
110. Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) states that "[iun making its determination [the court] is
not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges."
111. 557 F.2d 1, rehearing denied, 561 F.2d 406 (lst Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 922
(1978).
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evidence of the conspiracy would constitute the bootstrapping cau-
tioned against in Glasser v. United States." 12 However, the First Circuit
doubted the continued viability of the Glasser rule that admission of
co-conspirator remarks may only be based on evidence independent of
those remarks." t3  The court observed that the policy behind rule
104(a) recognizes a trial judge's ability to weigh the reliability of inad-
missible evidence such as co-conspirator statements. It felt that a crim-
inal defendant would still be protected if the judge were to:
require significant independent evidence of the existence of the con-
spiracy, deviating from the Glasser practice only to the extent of per-
mitting the district court to consider the independent evidence in the
light of the color shed upon it by the highly trustworthy and reliable
portions of the hearsay utterance seeking admission.'14
Thus, the First Circuit recommended that the judge give limited weight
to the challenged declaration when deciding whether to admit it." 5
Conversely, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth" 16
and Eighth' 7 Circuits have adhered to the traditional rule of Glasser
which states that admissibility of co-conspirator statements must be
based on an independent showing of the conspiracy and the defend-
ant's role in it. The court in United States v. James"8 construed rule
104(a) to permit the trial judge to consider other inadmissible evidence,
but not the statement for which admissibility is being determined, lest
there be insufficient corroboration of the statement's reliability.' '9
Two other United States Courts of Appeals, the Second 20 and
112. 315 U.S. 60 (1942). See text accompanying note 74 supra.
113. The admissibility of co-conspirator statements in United States v. Martorano, 561 F.2d
406 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 922 (1978) was finally resolved without need to consider
the statements themselves in assessing the existence of a conspiracy. The crucial co-conspirator
declaration was admitted as a verbal act, rather than as the statement of a co-conspirator. Thus,
the court avoided the need to regard Glasser as overruled by rules 104(a) and 801(d)(2)(E).
114. Id. at 408. See also United States v. Martorano, 557 F.2d 1, 12 (lst Cir. 1977).
115. See Bergman, The Co-Conspirators' Exception: Defining the Standard of the Independent
Evidence Test Under the New Federal Rules ofEvidence, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 99 (1976). Under the
author's proposal, the statements themselves could be considered by the judge, along with the
nonhearsay evidence, so long as the totality of the evidence convinced the judge beyond a reason-
able doubt that a conspiracy existed. If the judge was not convinced of the conspiracy, the defend-
ants would be acquitted of the conspiracy count. The author thinks this solution is the most
workable and fair, since he believes judges and jurors who hear co-conspirator declarations do not
really disregard them when deciding if the burden of proof has been met.
116. United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1978), rehearing en banc, 590 F.2d 575,
581 (5th Cir. 1979).
117. United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1978). Neither the Sixth nor Seventh Cir-
cuits addressed the question of whether the "hearsay" statement itself may be considered in meet-
ing the preponderance of the evidence burden.
118. 576 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1978), rehearing en banc, 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979).
119. Id at 1131.
120. United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d. 1116 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1028 (1970).
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Third' 21 Circuits, adopted a fair preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard for admitting co-conspirator declarations prior to enactment of
the new Federal Rules of Evidence. The fair preponderance standard
was first set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in its 1969 opinion, United States v. Geaney. 22 In that case, the
court stated:
[T]he judge must determine, when all the evidence is in, whether in
his view the prosecution has proved participation in the conspiracy,
by the defendant against whom the hearsay is offered, by a fair pre-
ponderance of the evidence independent of the hearsay utterances. If
it has, the utterances go to the jury for them to consider along with
all the other evidence in determining whether they are convinced of
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If it has not, the judge
must instruct the jury to disregard the hearsay or, when this was so
large a proportion of the proof as to render a cautionary instruction
of doubtful utility . . . declare a mistrial if the defendant asks for
it. 12 3
The relative burden of the preponderance test of the Second Cir-
cuit is illustrated in United States v. Stanchich,124 where the judge dis-
missed the conspiracy count but allowed the "co-conspirator"
statements to be considered by the jury on the substantive counts. The
trial judge felt that the evidence, including the admissible co-conspira-
tor declarations, did not meet the Second Circuit's beyond a reasonable
doubt test for submission of the conspiracy count to the jury. 25 How-
ever, the independent evidence of the conspiracy was found to meet the
lower preponderance test necessary for admission of the statements. 126
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted
the fair preponderance standard in the 1971 case of United States v.
Bey. 127 In doing so, it based the required quantum of evidence for
admitting co-conspirator declarations upon the standard set by the Sec-
ond Circuit. 28
As envisioned by the courts which have adopted it, the preponder-
ance standard is less burdensome than the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard for admission of co-conspirator statements. Several of the cir-
cuits indicate that by requiring a preponderance standard, rather than a
prima facie showing, they have increased the requisite burden of proof.
121. United States v. Bey, 437 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1971).
122. 417 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1969).
123. Id at 1120.
124. 550 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1977).
125. See note 86 supra.
126. 550 F.2d at 1299.
127. 437 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1971).
128. Id at 191. See also United States v. Trotter, 529 F.2d 806, 811 (3d Cir. 1976).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
This higher standard was deemed necessary to safeguard defendants
since it is now the judge alone who decides the applicability of co-con-
spirator remarks. As with the prima facie showing, the preponderance
standard seems to require introduction of evidence sufficient to con-
vince the judge that the defendant participated in the conspiracy. The
principal difference between the two quanta of proof is that in order to
decide by a preponderance the judge must hear and weigh all the evi-
dence-that presented by the prosecution and that presented in rebuttal
by the defendant. The contrasting views of the First and Fifth Circuits
on whether or not the judge can rely on the disputed statement itself
when deciding admissibility may present less of a real difference than
appears at first reading. As a judge decides whether the independent
evidence of the conspiracy supports admission of the statements, it is
almost as difficult for him or her as it is for a jury to compartmentalize
the declarations at issue. In actuality, many judges consider the utter-
ance along with the independent proof in making their determination.
Therefore, in the circuits which do not permit the trial judge to rely on
the co-conspirator remark itself, the only real difference may be that
those judges must justify their decisions to admit co-conspirator state-
ments in terms of the independent evidence alone.
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard
None of the circuit courts of appeals expressly requires that the
admission of co-conspirator declarations be based on independent
proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was involved in
the conspiracy.'2 9 However, courts in reality impose a beyond a rea-
sonable doubt standard on the admissibility inquiry when they instruct
the jury to reassess the independent evidence of conspiracy and use the
declaration against a defendant only if it first is convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant and the declarant were members
of the conspiracy. 130
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit' 3 ' con-
tinues such a practice. In addition, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit has recently undermined its professed prima facie
standard by resubmitting to the jury the issue of whether the co-con-
spirators' statements may be used against the defendant. 132 The re-
129. Judge Weinstein proposes a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. I J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, § 104[05], 104-44 (1977).
130. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
131. See Dennis v. United States, 346 F.2d 10, 16 (10th Cir. 1965), rev'don other grounds, 384
U.S. 855 (1966).
132. United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1976).
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viewing court has held the trial judge's failure to rule conclusively on
the statement's admissibility to be harmless error, observing that the
defendant could obviously not have been prejudiced by a second layer
of fact-finding. 133 Nevertheless, so long as trial courts in the Ninth Cir-
cuit continue to instruct juries to consider the independent proof of
conspiracy before considering co-conspirator declarations against a de-
fendant, and juries make an honest attempt to do so, the true burden is
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Recommendation
The various federal circuit courts of appeals are not in total accord
over the quantum of evidence nominally required to admit a co-con-
spirator's declarations against a defendant. 134 The lack of uniformity
exists not only among the circuits, but also within at least one of the
circuits. 35 Yet, numerous cases decided within the last two years have
served to alleviate some of the confusion. Recently, a trend has be-
come apparent toward adoption of a preponderance of the evidence
standard. Seven circuit courts 136 currently espouse it as the quantum
proof required for admitting co-conspirator statements into evidence.
The preponderance standard for the preliminary question of ad-
mitting co-conspirator utterances is preferable to the beyond a reason-
able doubt standard, 37 which is too high a burden of proof,
particularly when it must be applied by the jury. Instructing a jury to
use a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt renders co-conspir-
ator declarations virtually useless, since the evidence has to convince a
jury to convict on a conspiracy count before the jury can consider the
co-conspirator's remark against the defendant. In determining if a de-
fendant participated in the conspiracy, a standard of proof of less than
133. Id. at 849.
134. The United States Courts of Appeals for the Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits
apparently have not reexamined the burden of proof necessary for admission of co-conspirator
statements since the new Federal Rules of Evidence went into effect.
135. As an example of the lack of uniformity within a circuit, consider that the Fourth Circuit
adopted a "fair preponderance of the independent evidence" test in United States v. Jones, 542
F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1976), but indicated in the same opinion that slight evidence might meet the
preponderance requirement. In United States v. Stroupe, 538 F.2d 1063 (1976), decided shortly
after Jones, the court stated that the quantum of independent evidence needed to permit admis-
sion of co-conspirator statements was "enough to take the question to the jury," ile., prima facie
proof of the conspiracy or proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1065. From the
interchangeability of these terms, it is difficult to tell what standard of proof the Fourth Circuit
actually requires.
136. The United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh
and Eighth Circuits presently require that a preponderance standard be met. See text accompany-
ing notes 100-28 supra.
137. See text accompanying notes 129-33 supra.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
beyond a reasonable doubt is logically permissible. The burden of per-
suasion required for admission of co-conspirator remarks may and
should be separate and distinct from the beyond a reasonable doubt
burden required for the ultimate determination of guilt on the conspir-
acy issue. This is particularly so when it is the judge who must rule on
the admissibility of co-conspirator declarations.
In theory, the lesser burdens of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence and by prima facie evidence appear to require consideration
of different bodies of evidence. To conclude by a preponderance of the
evidence that a defendant was involved in a conspiracy entails consid-
eration of all the evidence presented by both parties, whereas to con-
clude by prima facie proof that a defendant was part of a conspiracy
only requires consideration of the prosecution's evidence taken as true
and uncontroverted.
However, as applied in practice to date, the preponderance of the
evidence, prima facie, and substantial independent evidence tests are
not very different.' 38 Regardless of the standard invoked, reviewing
courts are reluctant to find insufficient evidence to support a trial
court's admission of co-conspirator statements. 139 And, although the
facts of each case are unique, whichever burden of proof is purportedly
required, the courts of appeals use the same criteria to decide if the
conspiracy has been established and the defendant connected with it.
They weigh the nature and number of meetings, telephone calls and
conversations between the declarant and the defendant as well as par-
ticular acts of the defendant which show an awareness of or involve-
ment in the conspiracy, or which are highly suggestive of the
defendant's participation. At some point in this process, the acts of the
defendant, taken as a whole, indicate to the judge that the defendant
was part of the conspiracy, even though an innocent explanation for
each act might be possible if it were viewed in isolation. The critical
point of sufficiency of the evidence defies measurement by any precise
standard of proof. As Judge Friendly observed, "[wihen the matter is
viewed from the standpoint of the trial judge, it may be hard to say
more than that he must satisfy himself of the defendant's participation
138. It is possible as more circuits adopt the preponderance test for deciding the admissibility
of co-conspirator remarks, that trial practice in those circuits will vary increasingly from the prac-
tice of courts in circuits espousing a prima facie standard.
139. But see United States v. Holder, 560 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Peterson,
549 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Stroupe, 538 F.2d 1063 (4th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Cirillo, 499 F.2d 872 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974); United States v. Oliva,
497 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1974).
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in a conspiracy on the basis of the nonhearsay evidence." 40 Likewise,
appellate judges apparently find the burden of proof has been met
when their assessment of the evidence convinces them of the defend-
ant's participation in the conspiracy.
Thus, it appears that upon appellate review, admission of co-con-
spirator statements is little affected by the standard of proof selected as
appropriate by the reviewing court, whether it is a preponderance,
prima facie or substantial independent evidence burden. The only dis-
tinction between these standards is that the trial judge must hear the
defendant's proof before a preponderance test can be invoked and co-
conspirator declarations admitted. As a result, a preponderance stan-
dard will require trial courts either to conduct a hearing outside the
presence of the jury or to conditionally admit co-conspirator declara-
tions subject to a ruling at the close of the defendant's case on whether
the preponderance standard has been satisfied. In view of these restric-
tions on when the judge can rule on admissibility and the fact that de-
fense evidence may not appreciably add to the judge's ability to assess
the evidence corroborating the conspiracy which is presented by the
prosecution, the preponderance standard is not the best.
Proof by substantial, independent evidence would be a better stan-
dard because it comes closest to naming the criteria actually used by
judges to satisfy themselves that a conspiracy existed. As a standard of
proof, it has the advantage of not being confused with the burden to be
met at other phases of a trial (i*e., a prima facie showing) or at other
types of trials (i e., a preponderance test). Although the label used to
identify the standard of proof may not change the amount of evidence
an individual judge considers sufficient, the more honest denomination
of a standard of proof by substantial independent evidence is the best
way to put prosecutors and defendants on notice of instances when co-
conspirator statements can predictably be used against a defendant.
CONCLUSION
Under the new Federal Rules of Evidence, the questions of who
determines the admissibility of co-conspirator statements and by what
standard of proof have not been uniformly resolved by the various cir-
cuit courts of appeals. A majority of the circuits has held that rule
104(a) requires that the judge alone decide when co-conspirator decla-
rations may be used against a defendant. A slightly narrower majority
140. United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1028
(1970).
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of the courts has found that the judge must make the determination of
the defendant's participation in the conspiracy by a preponderance of
the evidence. In view of the similar results reached by reviewing courts
regardless of which of the less-than-beyond a reasonable doubt stand-
ards of proof is employed, it is recommended that a burden of substan-
tial independent evidence be generally required to support admission
of co-conspirator remarks. But more crucial than the labeling of the
requisite standard of proof is a requirement that judges rule on the
admissibility of co-conspirator declarations out of the jury's presence.
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